History SL

IB SL — Question Bank

Q1.

Source-Based Question 1

Read the following source, then answer the questions below.

Source A: Baha ad-Din ibn Shaddad, personal secretary to Saladin, The Rare and Excellent History of Saladin, written c.1195–1200, describing the massacre at Ayyadieh (August 20, 1191).

> "Then the king of England, may God curse him, ordered all the Muslim prisoners to be brought forward — around 2,700 men — and had them all killed. The Franks fell upon them all at once and slaughtered them in cold blood with sword and lance. Our men, observing this from the heights, could do nothing to help them. When Saladin saw what had been done, he was overwhelmed with grief and wept bitterly."

Question 1a (3 marks): According to Source A, what happened at Ayyadieh and what was Saladin's reaction?

Model Answer:

According to Source A, Richard I ordered the killing of approximately 2,700 Muslim prisoners, who were slaughtered "in cold blood with sword and lance" by Crusader forces. The author states that Muslim forces watching from the heights were unable to intervene. Saladin's reaction, as described by the author, was extreme grief — he "was overwhelmed with grief and wept bitterly" — presenting the sultan as emotionally moved by the fate of the prisoners and powerless to prevent the massacre.

Question 1b (4 marks): Evaluate the value and limitations of Source A for historians studying Richard I's military leadership.

Model Answer:

Origin and Purpose: Source A was written by Baha ad-Din ibn Shaddad, Saladin's personal secretary, who accompanied the sultan on campaign during the Third Crusade.

Written between approximately 1195 and 1200 — within a few years of the events described — it is a near-contemporary source from someone with direct access to Saladin and to the Muslim military perspective. Its purpose is biographical: to record Saladin's life and conduct, presenting him as a righteous, grieving, and dignified ruler.

Value: As an account by a participant with access to Saladin's personal reactions, the source is valuable for understanding how the massacre was perceived in the Muslim camp and for establishing the basic fact that a mass killing occurred. The detail of scale (2,700 prisoners) and method ("sword and lance") is consistent with other sources, lending it some evidential weight as a record of the event itself. The source's portrayal of Saladin's grief is valuable for understanding how medieval Islamic rulers were expected to present themselves and the symbolic importance attributed to prisoners of war.

Limitations: The source's value as an objective account of Richard I's motivations and decision-making is severely limited by its origin and purpose. Baha ad-Din's role as Saladin's secretary means the biography exists to praise Saladin and present his opponents — including Richard — in the worst possible light. The phrase "may God curse him" before Richard's name signals the author's perspective clearly. The source does not record the Crusader justification for the massacre (that Saladin had failed to meet the agreed prisoner-exchange terms), omitting context that a Crusader chronicler would have emphasised. Historians studying Richard's decision-making cannot rely on this source alone — they must corroborate it with Crusader accounts and modern analysis.

Q2.

Source-Based Question 2

Source B: Ambroise, L'Estoire de la Guerre Sainte (The History of the Holy War), an Old French verse chronicle by a Norman poet who participated in the Third Crusade, written c.1195, describing the same events at Ayyadieh.

> "Then the king gave the order, and all the hostages were put to the sword; those were they who had been given to us as pledges that the city [Acre] would be surrendered and the terms kept. But the terms were broken by Saladin, for he failed to send the Cross and the money and the captives he had promised, and thus it fell out that he lost his hostages."

Question 2 (6 marks): Compare and contrast Source A and Source B as evidence for what happened at Ayyadieh and why.

Model Answer:

Sources A and B both confirm that Richard I ordered the execution of Muslim prisoners following the fall of Acre — the basic factual event is corroborated by both accounts. Both sources agree on the approximate context: a prisoner exchange that did not proceed as expected. Beyond this agreement, however, the two sources diverge fundamentally in their framing, attribution of responsibility, and moral interpretation.

Points of agreement: Both sources accept that a mass killing of prisoners occurred and that it was ordered by Richard I. Neither source questions the scale of the event. Both sources also implicitly acknowledge that a prisoner exchange had been negotiated as part of Acre's surrender — Source B explicitly mentions "pledges," while Source A's reference to Saladin watching helplessly suggests he was still in negotiations. This shared factual core gives historians confidence in the basic outline of events.

Points of difference: The sources differ completely in the attribution of responsibility. Source A presents the massacre as an unprovoked act of cruelty by Richard ("may God curse him") and makes no reference to any breach of terms by Saladin. Source B inverts this entirely: it presents the execution as a consequence of Saladin's failure to honour the agreed terms of surrender — sending the True Cross, a ransom payment, and Crusader prisoners as promised. In Source B, Saladin "lost his hostages" because he broke the agreement; the responsibility is his. Source A does not acknowledge this framing at all.

The difference in framing is explicable by origin and purpose. Source A was written to honour Saladin and present him as a righteous, grieving ruler — acknowledging his breach of terms would undermine that portrayal. Source B was written for a Christian European audience who needed to understand the Crusade as a just and holy enterprise — presenting the massacre as a response to a breach of contract made it legally and morally defensible within medieval Christian just-war theory.

Together, the sources illustrate why historians need multiple perspectives: each source is highly revealing about its author's purpose and audience, but neither alone provides a reliable account of Richard I's actual decision-making. Modern historians generally conclude that Saladin did fail to meet the agreed terms, that Richard's decision was partly military (he could not march south with thousands of hostile prisoners requiring guards), and that the massacre was both pragmatic and brutal — a combination that neither source acknowledges.

Q3.

Source-Based Question 3

Source C: The Secret History of the Mongols, compiled c.1227, surviving in copies from the 14th century, describing Temujin's early hardship after his father's death.

> "When his father Yesugei Ba'atur died, his people and servants abandoned him. They said: 'He is young, he has not proved himself.' And then Temujin and his family were left alone. Heaven and earth were set against him. At this time the only thing that was loyal was his shadow. Only the horse beneath him was faithful."

Question 3 (9 marks): Using Sources A, B, and C and your own knowledge, evaluate the argument that great military leaders are primarily shaped by early hardship and disadvantage.

Model Answer:

The proposition that great military leaders are primarily shaped by early hardship has some historical basis, but it is a partial and potentially misleading explanation when tested against the evidence of both case studies in this Prescribed Subject. The sources illuminate different aspects of the question, and broader historical knowledge qualifies the argument significantly.

Source C (the *Secret History of the Mongols*) provides the most direct support for the hardship thesis in relation to Genghis Khan. The passage describes Temujin's abandonment after his father's death in terms of cosmic isolation — "heaven and earth were set against him" — and presents his subsequent survival and rise as a triumph of individual will against total vulnerability. This origin story is foundational to how the Mongol tradition interpreted Genghis Khan's greatness: the challenges of his youth explain the qualities — self-reliance, resourcefulness, absolute ruthlessness toward enemies, intense loyalty to those who remained faithful — that made him an effective commander. However, the source's limitations must inform how much weight we place on this argument. The *Secret History* was compiled to establish the dynastic legitimacy of Genghis Khan's successors; the narrative of early hardship overcome is a standard trope in the founding myths of ruling dynasties across cultures, and the document blends oral tradition with later ideological shaping. We cannot verify the events it describes as historical fact, and the rhetorical function of the passage — to make Genghis Khan's rise seem predestined — limits its value as evidence of actual causation.

Sources A and B, concerning Richard I, do not directly address his early life. Taken together, they illustrate his leadership in action (at Ayyadieh and during the Third Crusade), but they do not speak to whether hardship shaped his qualities. Historical knowledge of Richard I's background challenges the hardship thesis in his case: Richard was born a prince, educated, and trained for command from childhood. His formative military experiences (the Aquitaine campaigns, the revolt against Henry II) were not hardships of deprivation but the regular challenges of a medieval nobleman navigating political violence within his own family. The revolt of 1173–1174, in which Richard joined his brothers against his father, was traumatic but not analogous to Temujin's survival on the steppe after abandonment. If hardship shaped Richard's qualities, it was the hardship of political betrayal and family conflict rather than physical deprivation.

Beyond the sources, broader historical knowledge qualifies the argument further. Many successful military commanders did not experience exceptional early hardship: Philip II of Macedon (father of Alexander the Great), Julius Caesar, and Napoleon all had relatively advantaged backgrounds. Conversely, many people who experienced severe early hardship did not become military leaders of any significance. Hardship may provide certain qualities — resilience, hunger for security, willingness to use extreme methods — but these qualities require additional factors: access to resources, political opportunity, the ability to attract and retain followers, and strategic intelligence. In Genghis Khan's case, all of these were present; his early hardship may have been a necessary but not sufficient cause of his later success.

The most defensible conclusion is that early hardship was one significant factor among several in shaping both leaders, and that it cannot be treated as the primary or sole explanation. For Genghis Khan, the steppe environment and early abandonment plausibly contributed to his tactical ruthlessness and his understanding of survival dynamics — but the *Secret History* is an ideologically shaped source, and the causal link should be stated as probable rather than certain. For Richard I, early hardship in the conventional sense is a weaker explanatory variable — his political formation within the Plantagenet family's power struggles is a more precise description of his formative experience. The proposition is suggestive rather than sufficient.

Q4.

Model Answer — Q1:

According to Source A, the Spanish soldiers were overwhelmed by the scale and sophistication of Tenochtitlan. First, Díaz describes the city as appearing like the "enchanted" cities of romance novels, suggesting it exceeded anything the soldiers had previously experienced. Second, he notes the size and orderliness of its markets, which he compares favourably to those in Spain. Third, the causeways and infrastructure connecting the island city to the mainland impressed the soldiers as feats of engineering. [3 clear points from the source — 3/3 marks]

Q5.

Model Answer — Q2:

Sources A and B both describe the first encounter between the Spanish and the Aztecs, but they present very different perspectives. **In terms of similarities**, both sources acknowledge the dramatic nature of the encounter — Díaz (Source A) describes wonder, while the Florentine Codex (Source B) describes anxiety. Both sources also suggest that the arrival of the Spanish was perceived as extraordinary and unprecedented.

In terms of differences, Source A presents the encounter from a position of admiration and confidence — the Spanish are impressed but not threatened. Source B, by contrast, presents the encounter from a position of fear and uncertainty — Moctezuma is anxious and sends gifts, suggesting appeasement or caution rather than welcome. Additionally, Source A focuses on the physical city (markets, causeways), while Source B focuses on the psychological and religious dimensions (omens, anxiety), reflecting the different concerns of the two cultures. [2 similarities + 2 differences, referencing both sources — 4/4 marks]

Q6.

Model Answer — Q3:

Source C (Rashid al-Din): Value: Rashid al-Din was a senior official in the Ilkhanate government with access to Mongol administrative records and oral histories. His position gave him access to details about Mongol decision-making that external observers would not have had. The account provides insight into how the Mongols justified the destruction of Baghdad — as the consequence of defiance rather than unprovoked aggression. **Limitation:** As vizier to the Ilkhan Ghazan, Rashid al-Din had a political incentive to present the Mongol conquest as legitimate and justified. His account may minimise civilian suffering or Mongol aggression to serve his patron. Additionally, he was writing approximately 50 years after the events, relying on second-hand accounts rather than direct observation.

Source D (Ibn al-Athir): Value: Ibn al-Athir was a contemporary of the Mongol invasions, writing during the campaigns themselves. His emotional description of civilian suffering provides a perspective from within the communities being attacked, which official Mongol sources do not capture. His comparison of the Mongol invasion to the greatest catastrophe since creation conveys the scale of the psychological impact on the Islamic world. **Limitation:** Ibn al-Athir's intense emotional language suggests a purpose of documenting injustice and appealing to Muslim solidarity, which may lead to exaggeration of Mongol atrocities or casualty figures. He was also writing about campaigns he did not personally witness (he was based in Mosul), relying on refugee accounts and rumour, which may compromise accuracy. [Value + limitation for each source, connected to origin and purpose — 6/6 marks]

Q7.

Model Answer — Q4 (outline):

Introduction: The statement is partially valid — both the Spanish and Mongol conquests caused enormous destruction — but it oversimplifies the impact by ignoring continuity, adaptation, and the creation of new hybrid cultures.

Body paragraph 1 — Evidence for destruction: Use Sources C and D to demonstrate the scale of destruction at Baghdad (libraries, infrastructure, the Caliphate itself). Add own knowledge of Tenochtitlan's destruction, demographic collapse (25 million to 1 million), and the systematic destruction of codices and temples. This supports the claim that destruction was a major impact.

Body paragraph 2 — Limitations of the "destruction" argument: Use Source B to show that Aztec knowledge and perspectives survived through post-conquest compilations like the Florentine Codex. Add own knowledge: syncretism (Virgin of Guadalupe), survival of Nahuatl, and the persistence of indigenous cultural practices alongside Spanish colonial culture. In Baghdad's case, the Ilkhanate eventually became Islamic (Ghazan's conversion, 1295), and Mongol patronage under Rashid al-Din (Source C) revived scholarly activity.

Body paragraph 3 — Alternative significant impacts: Own knowledge: long-term colonial structures (New Spain lasted 300 years; the racial casta system shaped Latin American society for centuries); the Mamluk defeat of the Mongols at Ain Jalut (1260) redirected Islamic political power to Egypt; the Pax Mongolica facilitated trans-Eurasian trade and cultural exchange. These structural changes arguably had more lasting significance than the initial destruction.

Conclusion: While destruction was the most dramatic immediate impact, the most historically significant long-term impacts were the creation of new political, social, and cultural structures — colonial systems in the Americas, the Ilkhanate's transformation into an Islamic state, and the redistribution of power across the Islamic world. [Clear argument, integrates sources and own knowledge, structured — 9/9 + 2/2 marks]

Q8.

Source-Based Question 1

Read the following source, then answer the questions below.

Source A: Statement by Neville Chamberlain outside 10 Downing Street, London, after returning from Munich, September 30, 1938.

> "The settlement of the Czechoslovakian problem which has now been achieved is, in my view, only the prelude to a larger settlement in which all Europe may find peace. This morning I had another talk with the German Chancellor, Herr Hitler, and here is the paper which bears his name upon it as well as mine… We regard the agreement signed last night and the Anglo-German Naval Agreement as symbolic of the desire of our two peoples never to go to war with one another again."

Question 1a (3 marks): According to Source A, what does Chamberlain believe Munich represents?

Model Answer:

According to Source A, Chamberlain believes Munich is "only the prelude to a larger settlement" for all of Europe, suggesting he sees it as a foundation for broader peace rather than a one-off agreement. He also presents the meeting with Hitler and the paper they both signed as evidence of a shared desire by the British and German peoples "never to go to war with one another again." He implies that the Czechoslovakian "problem" has been solved through negotiation and that this sets a precedent for resolving other disputes similarly.

Question 1b (4 marks): Evaluate the value and limitations of Source A for historians studying the appeasement policy.

Model Answer:

Origin and Purpose: Source A is a public statement by British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain, delivered outside 10 Downing Street on September 30, 1938, after his return from Munich. Its purpose is primarily rhetorical — to reassure the British public and justify the Munich Agreement to a domestic audience that had been bracing for war.

Value: As a primary source by the architect of appeasement produced at the precise moment of its greatest triumph, the source is highly valuable for understanding how British leaders framed the policy. Chamberlain's language — "symbolic of the desire of our two peoples," "prelude to a larger settlement" — reveals the fundamental assumption of appeasement: that Hitler's grievances were negotiable and his ultimate goals were limited and rational. This assumption is central to explaining why appeasement was pursued at all, making the source essential for historians studying British strategic thinking.

Limitations: The source's value is limited by its public and performative nature. As a speech to a relieved crowd after a crisis, Chamberlain was speaking diplomatically rather than candidly — his private diary entries from this period reveal considerably more doubt and anxiety than appear here. Furthermore, the source reflects Chamberlain's ignorance of key evidence available to historians: the Hossbach Memorandum (November 1937) in which Hitler outlined plans for aggressive expansion, and Mein Kampf's explicit statement of goals that far exceeded Sudeten autonomy. The source thus tells us much about the perception that drove appeasement but little about whether that perception was accurate.

Q9.

Source-Based Question 2

Source B: Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia, address to the League of Nations Assembly, Geneva, June 30, 1936.

> "I assert that the issue before the Assembly today is not merely a question of the settlement of Italian aggression. It is collective security; it is the very existence of the League of Nations. It is the confidence that each State is to place in international treaties. It is the value of promises made to small States that their integrity and their independence shall be respected and assured. In a word, it is international morality that is at stake… It is us today. It will be you tomorrow."

Question 2a (3 marks): According to Source B, what does Haile Selassie argue is ultimately at stake in the Abyssinian Crisis?

Model Answer:

According to Source B, Haile Selassie argues that the Abyssinian Crisis is not merely about Italy's aggression against Ethiopia — it is about the survival of the League of Nations as a credible institution and the value of international treaties. He specifically identifies “collective security,” “the confidence each State is to place in international treaties,” and “international morality” as what is at stake. His closing warning — “It is us today. It will be you tomorrow” — argues that if small states cannot rely on collective security, all states (including the great powers) will eventually face unchecked aggression alone.

Question 2b (6 marks): Compare and contrast Source A (Chamberlain at Downing Street, 1938) and Source B (Haile Selassie at Geneva, 1936) as evidence for the failure of collective security in the 1930s.

Model Answer:

Sources A and B both document key moments in the collapse of collective security, but they offer sharply contrasting perspectives: Source A represents the appeasers’ confidence that bilateral negotiation could replace collective action, while Source B articulates the view from the victim of that approach.

Points of agreement: Both sources reflect the crisis of international order in the 1930s. Both implicitly acknowledge that existing international institutions were failing — Chamberlain’s enthusiasm for his bilateral “paper” with Hitler (Source A) reveals that he had effectively bypassed the League, while Haile Selassie’s speech (Source B) directly diagnoses the League’s failure to respond to aggression. In different ways, both sources show that collective security was being replaced by bilateral deals.

Points of difference: The sources differ fundamentally in tone and conclusion. Source A is optimistic — Chamberlain presents bilateral Anglo-German agreement as a sufficient substitute for collective security, asserting that a paper signed by two leaders can guarantee peace. Source B is a desperate appeal for collective action precisely because bilateral deals between great powers had already failed the smaller nations. Haile Selassie implicitly condemns the approach Chamberlain celebrates.

They also differ in their implied audience and purpose. Chamberlain addresses a British public that wants reassurance; his purpose is to justify a concession as a triumph. Haile Selassie addresses the very institution that had failed him, seeking to shame it into action by making the case that its own survival depends on enforcing collective security. The prophetic quality of Source B’s closing warning — proven correct within three years — gives it a retrospective force that Source A lacks.

Together, the sources illustrate the central tension of the 1930s: between a small-state view that the League must enforce collective security or die, and a great-power view that managed bilateral agreements were a safer path to stability. The events of 1939–1941 vindicated Source B’s analysis.

Q10.

Source-Based Question 3

Source C: A.J.P. Taylor, The Origins of the Second World War (1961), Chapter 7.

> "Munich was a triumph for all that was best and most enlightened in British life; a triumph for those who had preached equal justice between peoples; a triumph for those who had courageously denounced the harshness and short-sightedness of Versailles… It is impossible to judge Chamberlain's policy by events after Munich. The question is whether, given the circumstances of September 1938, there was an alternative to what he did."

Question 3 (9 marks): Using Sources A, B, and C and your own knowledge, evaluate the argument that appeasement was a reasonable policy given the circumstances of the late 1930s.

Model Answer:

The argument that appeasement was "reasonable given the circumstances" has serious historical grounding, but the weight of evidence — from the sources and from broader historical knowledge — suggests it was ultimately a miscalculation rooted in a fatal misunderstanding of Hitler's goals.

Source C (A.J.P. Taylor) provides the most forceful defence of appeasement. Taylor argues that Munich reflected "all that was best and most enlightened in British life" and that judging Chamberlain requires evaluating the alternatives available in September 1938, not the hindsight of 1945. Taylor's argument has partial validity: Versailles had treated Germany harshly, particularly regarding the Sudetenland (where 3.5 million Germans lived under Czech administration), and there were genuine self-determination arguments for revision. Moreover, as Taylor implies, British rearmament was incomplete in 1938 — the RAF's radar defences were not yet operational, and British military planners advised that war was not winnable in that year.

Source A (Chamberlain, 1938) reveals the sincere belief underlying appeasement — that Hitler was a negotiating partner, not a conqueror, and that a personally signed agreement between leaders could substitute for institutional collective security. This belief was not obviously irrational in September 1938: Hitler had, in the preceding months, been partly constrained by international pressure (the May 1938 war scare had briefly deterred him), and there were British officials who genuinely believed his territorial ambitions would stop at unifying ethnic Germans.

However, the case for appeasement being "reasonable" is undermined by several factors outside the sources. First, the Hossbach Memorandum (November 1937) had explicitly recorded Hitler telling his military commanders that Germany must expand by force in Europe, going far beyond revision of Versailles — Chamberlain did not have access to this document, but it shows that Hitler's privately stated goals negated the entire premise of appeasement. Second, recent historical research (particularly Richard Overy's work) has challenged the military-weakness justification: Czechoslovakia had 35 well-equipped divisions, excellent mountain fortifications, and Franco-British forces that together outnumbered the Wehrmacht in September 1938. The military balance may have favoured intervention, not avoidance.

Source B (Haile Selassie, 1936) offers a prescient counterpoint to both Sources A and C. Selassie argued as early as 1936 that the failure to enforce collective security against Italy meant "it will be you tomorrow." His warning proved accurate: each capitulation (Manchuria 1931, Abyssinia 1935, Rhineland 1936, Austria 1938) emboldened the aggressors and devalued deterrence. From this perspective, appeasement was not reasonable because it rested on the premise that aggressors could be satisfied — a premise repeatedly falsified by events.

The decisive counter-evidence is March 1939: when Germany occupied Bohemia and Moravia (Czech, non-German territory), even Chamberlain acknowledged appeasement had failed, issuing the Polish guarantee. This collapse of the policy's own logic reveals its central flaw — it worked only if Hitler's goals were limited to self-determination for ethnic Germans, but they were not.

In conclusion, appeasement was understandable given the constraints of 1938 — military unpreparedness, public war-weariness, genuine Versailles grievances — and Taylor's warning against pure hindsight is methodologically important. But "understandable" is not the same as "reasonable." The policy was based on a fundamental misjudgement of Hitler's nature that was already available to Chamberlain through Mein Kampf and consistent patterns of behaviour since 1933. The sources, taken together, suggest that the strongest argument against appeasement is not military weakness but political diagnosis: by 1938, there was sufficient evidence that Hitler could not be permanently appeased.

Q11.

Model Answer:

This source is a letter written by Martin Luther King Jr. from Birmingham City Jail in April 1963, during the Birmingham campaign. King was responding to a public statement by eight white Alabama clergymen who had criticised the demonstrations as "unwise and untimely." The letter was later published nationally.

The source is **valuable** for several reasons. First, as a statement by the acknowledged leader of the Civil Rights Movement, it provides direct insight into the philosophy driving nonviolent direct action — King explicitly addresses the criticism that Black Americans should "wait" for change and argues that delay is itself a form of injustice. Second, because it was written during imprisonment (not retrospectively), it captures the urgency and frustration of the movement at a critical moment, unfiltered by hindsight. Third, the intended audience — moderate white Americans who sympathised with civil rights in principle but opposed disruptive protest — reveals the political challenge King faced: persuading potential allies that action was morally necessary.

However, the source has **limitations**. King was writing as an advocate, not as a neutral observer. His purpose was to justify the Birmingham campaign and defend direct action against criticism. He therefore presents the strongest possible case for his position and does not acknowledge any validity in the argument for gradualism or concerns about the practical risks of confrontation. The source represents King's perspective specifically — it does not reflect the views of other civil rights leaders such as Malcolm X (who rejected integration) or younger SNCC activists (who were becoming impatient with King's approach). Finally, while King frames the letter as a spontaneous response, it was in fact a carefully crafted public document — the "spontaneous" quality is itself part of its rhetorical strategy.

Examiner's note: This answer integrates OPVL rather than listing them separately, links the source's purpose to both its value and its limitations, and identifies specific gaps in perspective. Band 5—6.

Q12.

Model Answer:

This source is a speech by Hendrik Verwoerd, South Africa's Minister of Native Affairs and the primary architect of the Bantu Education Act (1953), delivered in the Senate in June 1954 while defending the Act during parliamentary debate.

The source is **exceptionally valuable** because it reveals the explicit reasoning behind one of apartheid's most damaging policies. Verwoerd states plainly that Black South Africans have "no place" above manual labour in white society, and that education must therefore prepare them for subordination. This candour is historically significant — many defenders of apartheid used euphemisms like "separate development" and "self-governance." Verwoerd's statement strips away that language and exposes the raw intent: to limit Black aspirations and entrench white economic dominance. As a speech by the government minister directly responsible for the policy, delivered in an official legislative forum, it is an authoritative statement of government intent.

The **limitations** of the source must also be considered. As a parliamentary speech, it was delivered to an audience of white legislators and was intended to justify legislation to political allies. Verwoerd was therefore presenting his policy in the terms most likely to gain support, emphasising control and order. He may have been more extreme in his language than the legislation itself — political speeches often overstate for effect. Furthermore, this source tells us what the government intended Bantu Education to achieve, but not what it actually achieved in practice — many Black South Africans resisted, subverted, or transcended the limitations of their education. The source also presents the government's view exclusively; the voices of Black students, parents, and teachers who opposed Bantu Education are absent.

Examiner's note: This answer demonstrates understanding that the source's very candour creates its value — it is unusual and revealing precisely because it is so explicit. The limitations section correctly notes that intent is not the same as outcome. Band 5—6.

Q13.

Model outline:

Introduction: Define nonviolent protest; note it took different forms in each context. Thesis: nonviolent protest was highly effective in the US where the political system could be pressured through moral witness and media; it was less effective in South Africa where the regime's willingness to use overwhelming force ultimately required a shift to armed struggle.

Paragraph 1 — For the claim (US):

- Montgomery Bus Boycott (1955—56): economic pressure + legal challenge = desegregation
- Birmingham (1963): televised violence against nonviolent marchers forced Kennedy to propose civil rights legislation
- Selma (1965): Bloody Sunday footage led directly to the Voting Rights Act
- Key mechanism: nonviolence worked because it exposed the moral bankruptcy of segregation to a national audience through television

Paragraph 2 — For the claim (South Africa, pre-1960):

- Defiance Campaign (1952): grew ANC membership from 7,000 to 100,000
- International attention and sympathy generated by peaceful protests

Paragraph 3 — Against the claim (South Africa, post-1960):

- Sharpeville (1960): peaceful protesters massacred; ANC banned
- The regime faced no democratic accountability — no elections to lose, no free press to embarrass, no independent courts to enforce rights
- MK's sabotage campaign (1961—1963) was a rational response to the closure of nonviolent options
- Source: Mandela's Rivonia speech explicitly argues nonviolence had failed

Paragraph 4 — Nuance:

- Even in the US, nonviolence was not sufficient alone — it required federal enforcement (troops at Little Rock, federal registrars under VRA)
- Legal strategy (NAACP), direct action (SNCC/CORE), and political lobbying (LBJ) all contributed
- The effectiveness of any method depends on context: political system, media environment, international pressure, regime type

Conclusion: Nonviolent protest was the most effective method where a democratic framework and free media existed to amplify its moral force (US). Where those conditions were absent (South Africa after 1960), other methods became necessary. The claim is therefore partially valid — context determines effectiveness.

Examiner's note: This outline scores Band 4—5 because it evaluates both sides with specific evidence, uses both case studies, considers context, and reaches a nuanced judgment.

Q14.

Model outline:

Introduction: Thesis: Individual leaders were important but not sufficient. Structural conditions (legal frameworks, economic pressures, international context) and mass participation were equally or more decisive.

Paragraph 1 — Leaders mattered (US):

- MLK: articulated the philosophy of nonviolence; chose Birmingham and Selma strategically; mobilised national opinion through rhetoric (March on Washington)
- LBJ: used political skill to pass CRA and VRA — without a president willing to spend political capital, legislation would have stalled
- Without King's leadership, the movement might have lacked coherence and national visibility

Paragraph 2 — Leaders mattered (South Africa):

- Mandela: his Rivonia speech became the defining statement of the anti-apartheid cause; his imprisonment made him a global symbol
- Luthuli: maintained the ANC's moral authority through commitment to nonviolence
- Verwoerd: as architect of apartheid, individual decisions shaped the system (Bantu Education was his personal project)

Paragraph 3 — Leaders were not sufficient:

- The Montgomery boycott was sustained by 50,000 ordinary people walking to work every day for over a year — not by King alone
- SNCC's sit-ins and Freedom Rides were driven by student activists, not established leaders
- In South Africa, thousands participated in the Defiance Campaign; Sharpeville was a PAC grassroots initiative
- Structural factors: the Great Migration, Cold War pressure, television technology, urbanisation — these created the conditions that made leadership effective

Paragraph 4 — Assessment:

- Leaders channelled and articulated grievances that already existed
- Without mass participation, leaders would have been isolated voices
- Without favourable structural conditions (media, international pressure, economic leverage), even the best leadership would have failed

Conclusion: Individual leaders were significant catalysts but not decisive in isolation. The most accurate assessment is that leadership and mass participation were mutually dependent — leaders needed movements, and movements needed leaders.

Q15.

Question 15 — Model Outline: Sharpeville as a turning point

Command term: Evaluate the significance — weigh the importance of Sharpeville against other factors and events; avoid treating it as an automatic "turning point" without justification.

Thesis: The Sharpeville Massacre was a genuine turning point in South African resistance history because it directly caused the banning of the ANC and PAC, forced the abandonment of nonviolent strategy, and internationalised the anti-apartheid struggle — but its significance must be weighed against prior developments (Defiance Campaign, Youth League radicalism) and later ones (Rivonia Trial, Soweto 1976).

Paragraph 1 — Evidence for significance:

- 69 killed, 180 wounded — the massacre's scale shocked both domestic and international audiences
- State of Emergency declared; ANC and PAC banned within weeks (April 1960)
- Banning made nonviolent legal protest impossible — the ANC could no longer hold public meetings, march, or campaign
- International reaction: UN Security Council called for an end to apartheid; South Africa isolated at the Commonwealth
- Direct causal link to MK's formation (December 1961) — Mandela has stated that Sharpeville made armed struggle a necessity

Paragraph 2 — Limitations of "turning point" framing:

- Radicalisation had been underway before 1960: ANC Youth League's 1949 Programme of Action already rejected petitioning in favour of mass action
- PAC broke from the ANC in 1959 precisely over the question of confrontational tactics
- The banning of organisations, while dramatic, did not end resistance — it changed its form rather than beginning resistance

Paragraph 3 — Other turning points:

- Rivonia Trial (1964): jailing of the entire MK leadership effectively ended internal armed resistance for a generation
- Soweto Uprising (1976): rejuvenated resistance with youth activism after more than a decade of quiescence
- These events also qualify as turning points — Sharpeville is necessary but not sufficient as the singular watershed

Conclusion: Sharpeville was highly significant — it marked the decisive end of legal nonviolent mass protest within South Africa and accelerated the internationalisation of the struggle. However, "turning point" language can obscure continuities: the conditions for this shift had been building for years. The most accurate formulation is that Sharpeville was the moment at which a long-developing crisis became irreversible.

Q16.

Model Answer: Source A suggests that the UN headquarters dismissed credible intelligence about the planned genocide and actively prevented UNAMIR from taking preventive action. Dallaire states he identified specific threats — "arms caches" and plans for "mass extermination" from an informant — but was ordered not to intervene. The source further suggests the UN's instruction to share intelligence with Habyarimana was counterproductive, as Dallaire's metaphor ("inform the fox") implies the UN was directing him to alert someone complicit in the planning. The overall suggestion is that bureaucratic caution at UN headquarters overrode field-level urgency.

Q17.

Model Answer: Source A is an extract from General Dallaire's memoir *Shake Hands with the Devil*, published in 2003 — nine years after the genocide. Dallaire was the UNAMIR commander on the ground, giving him **direct, first-hand knowledge** of communications with UN headquarters and the operational constraints his force faced.

The source is **valuable** because it provides a detailed insider account of the specific moment when early intervention was possible but blocked. Dallaire's account of the "genocide fax" episode is corroborated by the declassified cable itself (released in 1998), lending credibility to his version of events. His description of the UN's instruction to share intelligence with Habyarimana reveals the institutional dysfunction that prevented action — information a historian could not obtain from official UN records alone.

However, the source has **limitations**. As a memoir published years later, it is shaped by Dallaire's purpose: to explain the failure and assign responsibility. Dallaire has a personal stake in demonstrating that he warned headquarters and was overruled — this framing positions him as the clear-sighted officer constrained by bureaucratic inaction. While largely corroborated, the memoir may simplify complex decision-making within the UN Secretariat. Additionally, as a single perspective, it does not reveal the reasoning or constraints faced by officials in New York who received his warnings.

Q18.

Model Answer: Both Sources C and D address the legitimacy of NATO's military intervention in Kosovo, but they reach **opposite conclusions**.

Blair (Source C) frames the intervention as morally justified — a "just war" motivated by "values" rather than territorial ambition. He connects Kosovo to historical precedents of genocide (the Holocaust, Rwanda), implying that failure to act would repeat past moral failures. His argument rests on **humanitarian grounds**: ethnic cleansing creates an obligation to intervene.

Yeltsin (Source D) characterizes the same intervention as "open aggression" against a "sovereign" state. His argument rests on **legal and procedural grounds**: only the UN Security Council has the authority to authorize the use of force, and NATO acted without that authorization.

The key **contrast** is therefore between humanitarian justification (Blair) and legal sovereignty (Yeltsin). However, there is an implicit **similarity**: both leaders invoke international norms — Blair appeals to the norm against genocide, Yeltsin to the norm of state sovereignty and the authority of the UN Charter. The fundamental disagreement is over which norm takes precedence when they conflict.

Q19.

Question 1: "Compare and contrast the methods used by independence movements to achieve independence." Refer to two movements from different regions.

Command term: Compare and contrast — explicit similarities AND differences; conclude which factor/difference is most significant

Thesis: Independence movements in India and Algeria employed different primary methods — civil disobedience and mass politics versus armed struggle and diplomacy respectively — reflecting the different nature of their colonial situations. Yet both movements shared a critical dimension: the internationalisation of their struggles and the exploitation of the colonial power's declining moral authority and material capacity. The contrast in methods was ultimately less decisive than their shared goal of making colonial rule politically and economically unsustainable.

Case studies: India (Gandhi's Congress) and Algeria (FLN)

Similarities:

- Both movements had to win support from populations divided along ethnic, regional, or religious lines (Hindu-Muslim in India; Berber-Arab, rural-urban in Algeria)
- Both used **international forums** — Gandhi's India through the British Labour movement and the UN; FLN through the Arab League, UN General Assembly, and Non-Aligned Movement
- Both exploited the **declining capacity and moral authority** of their colonial power — Britain post-WWII financially exhausted; France morally damaged by torture revelations
- Both required **organisational structures** capable of mobilising mass populations: Congress three-tier structure; FLN wilaya system of regional military-political command

Differences:

- **Violence:** Gandhi's movement was principled about non-violence — campaigns were called off (Non-Cooperation after Chauri Chaura) to maintain this. The FLN's strategy was explicitly violent — targeting French civilians in the Battle of Algiers was deliberate, not aberrant
- **Colonial context:** India had been under British rule since 1858 with no large settler community capable of resistance; Algeria had 1 million European settlers

with French citizenship who could not be "persuaded" — only defeated or bought out
- **Speed:** Indian independence took 27 years from Gandhi's first major campaign (1920) to 1947; Algerian independence took just 8 years (1954–1962) — violent methods were faster, at higher cost
- **Role of WWII:** Britain's post-war weakness made negotiated independence possible in India; France's post-war weakness made it possible to resist France in Algeria, but France still fought for eight years

Conclusion:

The choice between civil disobedience and armed struggle was not merely ideological — it was structural, determined by the nature of settler presence and the colonial power's political will to fight. Both methods ultimately succeeded because they made the cost of continued colonial rule (financial, human, reputational) higher than the cost of withdrawal. The critical similarity is more analytically significant than the tactical difference: both movements succeeded by making colonialism unsustainable, not by making independence desirable to the colonial power.

Q20.

Question 2: "Assess the role of ONE leader in achieving independence for their country."

Command term: Assess — make a judgement about the leader's importance; acknowledge limits and other factors

Chosen leader: Kwame Nkrumah and Ghanaian independence

Thesis: Nkrumah was the decisive individual in achieving Ghanaian independence — his organisational genius, Pan-African ideology, and strategic reading of British post-war weakness were essential to the CPP's success. However, his role must be contextualised: structural factors (British financial exhaustion after WWII, the Gold Coast's cocoa wealth making the territory governable, the absence of a large settler community) created the conditions within which Nkrumah's skills became decisive. The leader mattered, but he mattered because of the situation he navigated.

Nkrumah's contribution:

- **Organisational innovation:** The CPP was a mass party with roots in market communities, veterans' associations, and rural cocoa farmers — constituencies that the UGCC's lawyer-dominated leadership had ignored. Without this organisational base, independence agitation would have remained an elite petition exercise
- **Strategic flexibility:** Nkrumah knew when to use Positive Action (the 1950 general strike) and when to negotiate. His willingness to work within British-designed constitutional frameworks after 1951 — accepting the role of "Leader

of Government Business" — allowed him to demonstrate competent self-government and remove British justifications for delay
- **International context:** Nkrumah's Pan-African connections and attendance at the 1945 Manchester Congress gave him international stature and links to anti-colonial movements worldwide, strengthening his negotiating position
- **Symbolic genius:** "Seek ye first the political kingdom" — Nkrumah understood that the masses needed inspiration, not just organisation

Limits of the individual:

- British structural weakness was not Nkrumah's creation — post-WWII exhaustion and American pressure on European empires created a permissive environment
- The Gold Coast had relatively advanced infrastructure (roads, cocoa market organisation) compared to other African territories — Nkrumah inherited a relatively organised society
- The CPP's base was created by structural social changes (urbanisation, education, veterans returning from WWII) that preceded Nkrumah's arrival
- Britain's choice to negotiate rather than suppress was made by British decision-makers (Governor Arden-Clarke) — Nkrumah could not have forced independence against determined British military opposition

Conclusion:

Nkrumah was necessary but not sufficient. His individual contributions — mass party organisation, strategic flexibility, international connections — were essential to converting Ghana's structural advantages (no settlers, manageable economy, Britain's post-war weakness) into independence in 1957. The "great man" and structural explanations are not alternatives; they are complementary levels of analysis for any independence movement.

Q21.

Question: "Examine the role of leaders in the development of democratic states."

Approach: This question requires you to argue a specific claim about leaders' role, supported by two case studies from different regions.

Essay plan:

Thesis: Democratic leaders were essential to democratic development not merely through formal constitutional reform but through their ability to build coalitions, respond to economic crises, and extend democratic participation to previously excluded groups — though their successes were frequently constrained by the limits of their political coalitions.

Paragraph 1 — Roosevelt and economic democratic reform (USA):

- Context: Great Depression; 25% unemployment; democratic stability threatened by extremist movements
- Roosevelt's New Deal as a democratic response: expanded federal role, Social Security, labour rights, financial regulation
- Key argument: Roosevelt succeeded where Weimar failed because he chose expansion over austerity, built a broad democratic coalition, and maintained constitutional governance
- Limitation: Racial compromises — New Deal excluded Black agricultural and domestic workers; Roosevelt refused anti-lynching legislation

Paragraph 2 — Nehru and democratic institution-building (India):

- Context: Independence from colonial rule; mass poverty and illiteracy; Partition trauma; ethnic and religious diversity
- Nehru established universal suffrage, parliamentary democracy, secular constitution, and federal structure
- Key argument: Nehru's commitment to democratic institutions was a deliberate political choice against both Hindu nationalism and single-party authoritarian alternatives available to post-colonial leaders
- Limitation: Emergency powers; Kashmir; uneven caste reform

Paragraph 3 — Counter-argument and analytical synthesis:

- Leaders are necessary but not sufficient: democratic development also required social movements (Civil Rights Movement), structural conditions (industrialisation, Enlightenment ideas), and international pressure (sanctions against apartheid)
- The Weimar case shows that the absence of effective democratic leadership — specifically Hindenburg's appointment of Hitler — could destroy democracy even when institutions formally existed

Conclusion: Leaders played a decisive but not deterministic role. Their success depended on their ability to translate structural conditions into democratic reforms, build coalitions wider than existing democratic majorities, and respond to crises without abandoning democratic principles.

Q22.

Question: "Evaluate the conditions that led to the emergence of democratic states."

Approach: Argue a hierarchy of conditions — which were most important and why. Use two or more regions.

Essay plan:

Thesis: While multiple conditions — industrialisation, Enlightenment ideas, social movements, and war — contributed to the emergence of democratic states, the most decisive condition was the development of organised political movements that translated social and economic grievances into specific democratic demands, since structural conditions alone did not automatically produce democratic outcomes.

Paragraph 1 — Industrialisation (UK and USA):

- UK: Industrial Revolution created urban middle class and working class excluded from pre-1832 franchise; Reform Acts 1832, 1867, 1884 responded to this new social reality
- USA: Industrial capitalism's inequalities drove Progressive Era demand for direct democracy mechanisms and regulatory reform
- But: industrialisation alone did not determine democratic outcomes — Germany industrialised rapidly before 1914 without democracy

Paragraph 2 — Social and suffrage movements:

- Women's suffrage movement (UK): NUWSS + WSPU campaigns; war service made exclusion indefensible
- Civil Rights Movement (USA): organised mass action translated formal 15th Amendment rights into real political participation
- Key argument: without organised movements, structural conditions produced no democratic change — Reconstruction's gains were reversed without sustained organised protection

Paragraph 3 — The role of ideas:

- Enlightenment natural rights provided the intellectual framework for democratic demands
- 1848 Revolutions showed that democratic demands, even when temporarily suppressed, permanently entered political discourse
- India: Gandhian nationalism drew on both Western Enlightenment and Indian tradition to build mass democratic political participation

Conclusion: All the identified conditions contributed, but social and political organisation was the decisive variable — the agency that translated conditions into democratic outcomes. This explains why identical structural conditions (industrialisation, Enlightenment tradition) produced democracy in some states and authoritarian alternatives in others.

Q23.

Question 1: "Economic factors were the main reason for the emergence of authoritarian states." Discuss with reference to two authoritarian states.

Command term: Discuss — argue multiple perspectives; reach a conclusion

Thesis (intro): Economic factors were a necessary but not sufficient condition for the emergence of authoritarian states. While the Great Depression and post-war economic dislocation created mass grievances that authoritarian movements exploited, structural political weaknesses and effective leadership in channelling resentment were equally important in determining whether authoritarian movements actually captured the state.

Case studies: Hitler's Germany and Mussolini's Italy

Paragraph 1 — Economic factors supporting the claim:

- Germany: Unemployment rose to 6.1 million by January 1933. Nazi vote share correlated directly with unemployment: 2.6% (1928, pre-Depression) → 18.3% (1930) → 37.4% (July 1932)
- Italy: Post-war economic dislocation; Biennio Rosso (1919–1920) — factory occupations and rural strikes terrified the middle class and industrialists, who financed the Fascist squads
- In both cases, the economic crisis delegitimised existing governments (Weimar coalitions' inability to respond; liberal Italy's trasformismo)
- Point: economic crisis created mass anxiety that authoritarian movements could channel

Paragraph 2 — Limitations of purely economic explanation:

- Germany had worse economic conditions in 1923 (hyperinflation) but Hitler's Beer Hall Putsch failed completely
- The Depression also devastated Britain and France — democratic countries where fascism did not win power. Therefore economic crisis alone cannot explain authoritarian emergence
- Italy's economic crisis (Biennio Rosso) had largely subsided by October 1922 when the March on Rome occurred — yet Mussolini still took power. Political factors (the king's decision not to use martial law) were decisive
- Point: the same economic conditions produced different political outcomes, suggesting political and institutional factors were independent variables

Paragraph 3 — Political/institutional factors:

- Weimar Republic's structural flaws: proportional representation, Article 48, presidential power, weak coalitions — these created a system that could not respond decisively to the Depression
- Italy: Liberal Italy's trasformismo had produced chronic governmental instability for decades before the Depression; the political system was already delegitimised independently of economics
- Without the conservative elite's miscalculation (inviting Hitler into a coalition; Victor Emmanuel III refusing martial law), neither leader would have taken power regardless of the economic context
- Point: political weakness was a precondition that economic crisis activated

Paragraph 4 — Role of leadership and ideology:

- Hitler's organisational genius and propaganda abilities (Goebbels), and the Nazi Party's cross-class appeal, distinguished German fascism from other right-wing

movements that failed in the same economic conditions
- Mussolini's ability to position himself as the protector of order (against the socialist threat) while remaining flexible on ideology was a leadership quality, not an economic variable
- Point: the ability to exploit conditions depended on the specific character of the authoritarian movement itself

Conclusion:

Economic factors were the primary **trigger** for mass support of authoritarian movements — without the Depression, it is very unlikely that either Hitler or Mussolini would have won sufficient support to challenge for power. However, the **conversion of that support into state power** depended on political factors: institutional weaknesses in existing systems and the calculated errors of conservative elites. A complete explanation requires all three dimensions: economic crisis, political weakness, and effective leadership. To argue economic factors were "the main reason" is to explain mass support but not to explain the specific political mechanisms by which the state was captured.

Examiner's note: This answer would score in Band 4–5. It addresses the command term ("discuss" = multiple perspectives), uses specific evidence (unemployment figures, dates, electoral percentages), maintains analytical focus on the question throughout, and reaches a nuanced conclusion that qualifies the claim without simply agreeing or disagreeing.

Q24.

Question 7: "Terror was the most important method used by authoritarian leaders to maintain power." To what extent do you agree? Refer to two authoritarian states.

Command term: To what extent — partially agree; weigh evidence for and against; qualified conclusion

Thesis (intro): Terror was an essential component of all three authoritarian regimes' maintenance of power, but its relative importance varied significantly. In Stalin's USSR, terror was arguably the dominant method, eliminating all potential rivals and creating a society of mutual surveillance. In Mussolini's Italy, however, consent — built through propaganda, the Lateran Treaties, and genuine popular approval in the 1930s — was at least as important as coercion. A complete account of how these regimes maintained power must recognise that terror and consent operated simultaneously and reinforced each other.

Case studies: Stalin's USSR and Mussolini's Italy (different regions if treating USSR as non-Western European)

Paragraph 1 — Terror as the primary mechanism (USSR):

- The Great Purge (1936–1938): approximately 750,000–800,000 shot in 1937–1938; all potential rivals within the Party eliminated
- The Gulag system: 18 million passed through; created a population who knew the consequences of non-compliance
- The military purge: 35,000–40,000 officers removed, including 3 of 5 Marshals — eliminated any military threat
- NKVD surveillance and denunciation system: created a climate of fear that extended into private life
- Assessment: In the USSR, terror was so pervasive that it is difficult to argue any other mechanism was more important to Stalin's maintenance of power

Paragraph 2 — Limits of terror as primary explanation (Italy):

- The OVRA had only approximately 1,000 full-time agents; the Special Tribunal sentenced fewer than 5,000 people across its entire existence
- De Felice's "years of consent" thesis: many historians argue that Mussolini enjoyed genuine popular support in the 1930s — economic improvements, the conquest of Abyssinia (1935–1936), the Lateran Treaties (1929)
- The Catholic Church — encompassing 99% of Italians — actively endorsed the regime after 1929
- Comparison: the limited scale of Italian terror suggests that consent mechanisms were equally or more important in Italy than coercion
- Point: Terror alone did not maintain Fascist Italy

Paragraph 3 — The combination of terror and consent:

- Even in the USSR, Sheila Fitzpatrick argues that ordinary Soviets developed strategies of accommodation and even genuine enthusiasm for Soviet projects (literacy campaigns, industrialisation, anti-fascism)
- In Germany, Ian Kershaw's "Hitler Myth" shows that terror worked alongside genuine popular approval of Hitler (high approval 1933–1942) — when approval declined during the war, the regime relied more heavily on terror
- Terror was most important as a mechanism against organised opposition (political parties, military officers); consent mechanisms were more important for managing the passive majority
- Point: the relationship between terror and consent was dynamic, not static

Conclusion:

Terror was the most important method in Stalin's USSR, where it reached a scale that eliminated all plausible internal threats to the regime. In Mussolini's Italy, by contrast, the limited scale of repression suggests that propagandistic consent — particularly through the Church alliance and genuine economic improvements — was at least equally important. The question as posed is therefore partially valid: it accurately describes the USSR but overstates the case for Italy. The most accurate generalisation is that authoritarian regimes maintained power through a combination of terror and consent, with the balance varying significantly between regimes and over time.

Q25.

Question 3: Compare and contrast the methods used by two authoritarian leaders to seize power.

Command term: Compare and contrast — find both similarities AND differences; structure around themes, not separate descriptions

Thesis (intro): Hitler and Mussolini both employed a combination of street violence, elite alliances, and propaganda to seize power, and both were ultimately elevated to office by conservative elites who miscalculated their ability to control them. However, they differed significantly in the institutional mechanisms through which they captured state power: Hitler relied primarily on the electoral legitimacy generated by the Nazi Party's mass mobilisation, while Mussolini relied on direct paramilitary intimidation through the squadrismo, which bypassed the electoral arena entirely.

Similarities:

1. **Street violence as political tool:** Both used paramilitary organisations (SA/SS in Germany; squadre in Italy) to intimidate, beat, and murder political opponents — primarily socialists and communists. The violence served both to suppress the left and to demonstrate strength to conservative supporters
2. **Elite sponsorship:** Both were funded and politically supported by industrialists and landowners who feared socialist revolution. Both were appointed to power by existing constitutional authorities (Hindenburg; Victor Emmanuel III) rather than seizing it by armed force against the state
3. **Propaganda:** Both used mass media, theatrical public events, and emotional nationalist rhetoric to build popular movements. Both positioned themselves as saviours from communism and national humiliation
4. **Legal pathway used alongside violence:** Neither came to power purely through violence — both maintained a legal face. Hitler ran in elections; Mussolini negotiated with Giolitti and ran a parliamentary party alongside the squads

Differences:

1. **Electoral vs. paramilitary emphasis:** Hitler built a genuine mass electoral movement — the Nazi Party won 37.4% in July 1932, the largest vote in Weimar history. Mussolini's Fascists never won a free election with comparable support; the March on Rome was a paramilitary threat, not an electoral mandate
2. **Timing of violence:** The squadrismo violence was most intense before Mussolini took power (1920–1922) and was used to destroy the left's organisational base before the final political move. SA violence was primarily used during the electoral campaign period (1930–1933) to intimidate opponents rather than to destroy infrastructure
3. **The role of existing institutions:** In Italy, the March on Rome was a direct paramilitary challenge to the state that the state chose not to resist. In Germany,

the transfer of power was entirely legal — Hindenburg appointed Hitler through the constitutional mechanism available to the president. The subsequent destruction of democracy was achieved through the Reichstag Fire Decree and the Enabling Act — legal instruments, even if the process was coerced

4. **Speed of power consolidation:** Hitler moved with extraordinary speed — he effectively ended German democracy within six months of taking office. Mussolini took three years from becoming Prime Minister (October 1922) to establishing full dictatorship (January 1925)

Conclusion:

Hitler and Mussolini present two versions of authoritarian seizure of power that share structural features — violence, elite support, propaganda, nationalist ideology — but differ fundamentally in their relationship to democratic legitimacy. Hitler used elections as a tool, converting mass votes into appointment to office. Mussolini bypassed elections with a paramilitary threat and relied on the monarchy's refusal to resist. Both paths led to the same destination, but through different institutional mechanisms. This comparison illustrates that there is no single "authoritarian playbook" — the specific path to power was shaped by each country's institutional context.

Q26.

Question 11: "Authoritarian leaders' economic policies benefited their states." To what extent do you agree? Refer to two authoritarian states.

Command term: To what extent — weigh evidence; qualified conclusion

Thesis: Economic policies under authoritarian states produced genuine short-term improvements in some indicators — notably in reducing unemployment and industrialising backward economies — but these gains were achieved at enormous human cost, created structural economic distortions, and were ultimately oriented toward military rather than civilian welfare. The extent of "benefit" depended heavily on who was included in the calculation and over what time period.

Case studies: Hitler's Germany and Stalin's USSR

Evidence for benefit — Germany:

- Unemployment: 6.1 million (1933) → 1.6 million (1936) → near-full employment (1938)
- Autobahn construction, public housing, rearmament drove economic recovery
- Real wages for employed workers rose modestly through 1938
- The German economy grew at approximately 8% per year 1933–1938

Evidence against benefit — Germany:

- The recovery was built on deficit spending (Mefo bills) — sustainable only if war produced conquest and plunder
- Rearmament meant consumers were squeezed — butter vs. guns (Goering: “guns make us powerful; butter only makes us fat”)
- Jewish Germans, Roma, and other excluded groups experienced confiscation of property, loss of livelihoods, and ultimately death — the “economic recovery” excluded approximately 1% of the population by design
- Germany faced a fiscal crisis by 1939 that made war economically attractive

Evidence for benefit — USSR:

- Steel production tripled; coal production quintupled 1928–1940
- Industrial base made Soviet victory over Nazi Germany possible 1941–1945
- Literacy rates rose dramatically; education and healthcare expanded
- Life expectancy rose from 32 (1913) to 47 (1939)

Evidence against benefit — USSR:

- Collectivisation killed approximately 5–8 million people
- Consumer goods were severely neglected; living standards for ordinary workers fell during industrialisation
- The Gulag provided forced labour as an input to industrialisation — benefits were built on slave labour
- The grain export policy during the 1932–1933 famine — exporting grain while millions starved — is not compatible with any definition of “benefit”

Conclusion:

Economic policies produced measurable benefits by narrow indicators (employment, industrial output) but these gains were achieved through methods — forced labour, genocide, starvation — that make any simple claim of “benefit” morally and empirically untenable. The more accurate assessment is that economic policies served the state and military apparatus effectively while often degrading the lives of the very populations they claimed to serve. Hitler’s economic recovery benefited employed ethnic Germans in the short term but was a preparation for war, not a foundation for sustainable prosperity. Stalin’s industrialisation created a heavy industrial base at a cost measured in millions of lives.

Q27.

Question 1: “Long-term causes were more important than short-term causes in bringing about 20th-century wars.” Discuss with reference to two wars.

Command term: Discuss — argue multiple perspectives; reach a conclusion

Thesis (intro): Long-term causes created the structural conditions in which 20th-century wars were possible — without the arms race, alliance systems, and imperial rivalry, the assassination at Sarajevo could not have triggered a world war. However, the conversion of structural tension into actual conflict depended critically on specific short-term decisions made by political and military leaders who chose escalation over de-escalation. In both WWI and WWII, long-term causes were necessary but not sufficient; short-term failures of diplomacy and deliberate strategic choices were the immediate determinants of war.

Case studies: World War I (Europe) and the Chinese Civil War (Asia)

Paragraph 1 — Long-term causes as structural preconditions (WWI):

- The alliance system meant that a local conflict could automatically expand: the Austro-Hungarian declaration of war on Serbia activated the Franco-Russian alliance, which activated Germany's war plan against France, which activated the Belgian neutrality guarantee and Britain's declaration of war
- The arms race (especially the Anglo-German naval rivalry) had generated mutual hostility and suspicion over decades — the military establishments of all powers had contingency plans that assumed war was likely
- Nationalist pressures in Germany and Austria-Hungary made diplomatic compromise politically costly: any leader who backed down risked being seen as weak before a nationalist public
- Point: the structural environment made war more likely and made diplomatic resolution harder — but it did not make war inevitable

Paragraph 2 — Long-term causes as structural preconditions (Chinese Civil War):

- Rural poverty (4% owning 50% of land) had produced deep class antagonism that made the CCP's land reform message politically powerful decades before the final phase of the civil war
- The "Century of Humiliation" and the collapse of imperial government left a power vacuum and nationalist resentment that both KMT and CCP sought to exploit
- The warlord era (1916–1928) normalised armed competition for state power and demonstrated that political disputes would be settled militarily
- Point: the long-term social and political conditions made violent conflict for state control almost structurally inevitable once a major challenge to KMT authority emerged

Paragraph 3 — Limits of long-term explanation (WWI):

- The same long-term conditions had existed throughout the decade before 1914 without producing world war — the Moroccan Crises (1905, 1911) and the Balkan Wars (1912–1913) were all resolved diplomatically
- The specific decisions of the July Crisis — Germany's blank cheque to Austria-Hungary, Austria-Hungary's deliberate use of an unacceptable ultimatum, Russia's decision to begin general mobilisation — were not determined by the long-term structural environment; they reflected political choices made by specific individuals under specific pressures

- Fischer's thesis that Germany deliberately provoked war in 1914 suggests that short-term political calculations (the desire to break the encirclement of the alliance system while Germany was still militarily superior) drove the July escalation
- Point: the fact that the same long-term conditions had not produced war earlier suggests that short-term decisions were the immediate cause

Paragraph 4 — Limits of long-term explanation (Chinese Civil War):

- The KMT-CCP split was not structurally predetermined: the First United Front (1924–1927) represented a genuine, if uneasy, collaboration
- Chiang Kai-shek's decision to launch the Shanghai Massacre (April 12, 1927) — a specific tactical choice to eliminate the CCP before it could challenge KMT authority — was the short-term trigger that converted political competition into civil war
- The CCP's survival (notably through the Long March, 1934–1935) and eventual victory depended on short-term military decisions and political strategies, not structural forces alone

Conclusion:

Long-term causes were indispensable in both cases: without structural tensions, the short-term triggers would have had no tinder to ignite. However, the argument that long-term causes were "more important" overlooks the fact that long-term structural conditions had existed for years without producing war — in both WWI and the Chinese Civil War, it required specific short-term decisions (the blank cheque; the Shanghai Massacre) to convert structural tension into actual conflict. The most accurate assessment is that long-term causes determined the environment in which war was possible, while short-term causes determined when and whether it actually occurred. Neither category alone is sufficient for a complete causal explanation.

Examiner's note: This answer would score in Band 4–5. It uses two case studies from different regions (Europe and Asia), addresses the command term directly (multiple perspectives, clear conclusion), employs specific evidence (blank cheque, Shanghai Massacre, percentages of land ownership), and maintains analytical focus on the causal hierarchy throughout.

Q28.

Question 11: "Peace settlements after 20th-century wars created more problems than they solved." Discuss with reference to two peace settlements.

Command term: Discuss — argue multiple perspectives; reach a conclusion

Thesis (intro): The peace settlements following WWI — particularly the Treaty of Versailles — created significant new problems: German resentment, unsustainable reparations, and an unstable new state system that contributed directly to the conditions for WWII. The post-WWII settlement, by contrast, was more pragmatic and in the

Western sphere produced a stable foundation for decades of prosperity, though it simultaneously created the division of Germany and Europe that defined the Cold War. Peace settlements therefore did not uniformly create more problems than they solved — the outcome depended on the coherence of the settlement, the willingness of great powers to enforce it, and whether it addressed or merely papered over underlying conflicts.

Case studies: Treaty of Versailles (1919) and the post-WWII settlement (Potsdam, 1945, and the broader Cold War order)

Paragraph 1 — Versailles: problems created:

- The "war guilt" clause (Article 231) was experienced by Germans across the political spectrum as a humiliation; it provided Hitler with a permanent propaganda weapon
- The reparations figure (132 billion gold marks) was economically unsustainable — the Dawes Plan (1924) and Young Plan (1929) required continuous American lending to maintain the system, which collapsed with the Depression in 1929
- New states created under the principle of self-determination were ethnically mixed and economically unviable: Czechoslovakia contained 3.5 million ethnic Germans (Sudeten Germans); the Polish Corridor separated East Prussia from Germany; the Danzig question was left unresolved
- The USA's withdrawal from Versailles (Senate rejection, November 1919) left the League without its most powerful potential enforcer from birth

Paragraph 2 — Versailles: problems solved:

- The settlement did end the war and prevent immediate renewed conflict
- New states (Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia) satisfied the legitimate national aspirations of millions of people who had lived under imperial rule
- Germany was not destroyed — it retained its territory, population, and industrial base; by 1929 it was the world's second-largest industrial economy
- The League of Nations, despite its weaknesses, mediated several territorial disputes successfully in the 1920s (the Aaland Islands, Upper Silesia)

Paragraph 3 — Post-WWII settlement: problems solved:

- The Nuremberg Principles established individual criminal accountability for war crimes — a new legal framework that has shaped international law ever since
- The Marshall Plan ($13 billion) and US occupation policies successfully rebuilt West Germany and Western Europe; by 1955 West German GDP had recovered to pre-war levels
- The United Nations, with its Security Council veto system, created a more realistic framework for great-power cooperation than the League's unanimity requirement
- The settlement's division of Germany, though deeply unsatisfactory, provided a stable framework within which Europe remained at peace for the entire Cold

War period

Paragraph 4 — Post-WWII settlement: problems created:

- The division of Germany and Europe created the Cold War confrontation — a new form of global conflict that lasted 45 years and produced proxy wars in Korea, Vietnam, and elsewhere
- The absence of a formal peace treaty with the USSR left the European settlement legally ambiguous until 1990
- The decolonisation process, accelerated but not managed by the post-WWII settlement, produced decades of conflicts in Asia (India-Pakistan, Indochina, Indonesia) and Africa
- The atomic bombing of Japan and the onset of nuclear competition between the USA and USSR created the permanent risk of existential war

Conclusion:

The Treaty of Versailles largely supports the claim: it created new problems (German resentment, unstable new states, unsustainable reparations) that outweighed the order it imposed, particularly because the enforcement mechanisms were too weak to maintain even its reasonable provisions. The post-WWII settlement is more ambiguous: in the Western sphere it created a durable and relatively prosperous order that would have been difficult to predict in 1945; the problems it created (Cold War, nuclear confrontation) were of a different character — the price of great-power competition rather than failures of the settlement itself. The generalisation that peace settlements create more problems than they solve is therefore partially valid for the specific case of Versailles but does not apply uniformly across all 20th-century peace settlements.

Q29.

Question 7: "Civilians suffered more than soldiers in 20th-century wars." To what extent do you agree? Refer to two wars.

Command term: To what extent — partially agree; weigh evidence; qualified conclusion

Thesis (intro): In WWI, soldiers unambiguously suffered more than civilians in quantitative terms: military deaths (10 million) dwarfed direct civilian casualties, and the trauma of trench warfare was concentrated in the military. By WWII, however, the thesis becomes strongly supported: approximately 38–55 million civilians were killed, outnumbering military dead (approximately 22 million) by a significant margin, and the Holocaust, strategic bombing, and Japanese occupation policies deliberately targeted civilian populations. The relationship between civilian and military suffering shifted dramatically between these two conflicts, reflecting the evolution of total war.

Case studies: World War I (Europe) and World War II (global)

WWI — evidence against the claim (soldiers suffered more):

- 10 million military dead vs. approximately 7 million civilian dead (direct causes)
- Battle of the Somme: 57,470 British casualties on July 1, 1916 alone — no comparable single-day civilian event
- Shell shock/PTSD: over 80,000 officially diagnosed British cases; the psychological burden of industrialised killing fell almost entirely on combatants
- Conditions in the trenches — constant artillery bombardment, gas attacks, vermin, trench foot, the psychological strain of anticipating “going over the top” — represented a form of suffering without civilian parallel

WWI — evidence for the claim (civilians also suffered severely):

- The 1918 influenza pandemic killed 50–100 million people worldwide — dwarfing all military casualties combined — and was partly spread by troop movements
- The Allied naval blockade of Germany (1914–1919) contributed to approximately 750,000 German civilian deaths from malnutrition
- Armenian Genocide (1915–1916): approximately 600,000–1.5 million Armenians killed by Ottoman authorities
- Populations of occupied Belgium and northern France lived under harsh German military administration

WWII — evidence strongly supporting the claim:

- Civilian dead (38–55 million) significantly exceeded military dead (approximately 22 million)
- The Holocaust: 6 million Jews murdered — entirely civilian victims; the genocide was deliberately conducted as a war aim
- Strategic bombing killed hundreds of thousands of civilians: approximately 300,000–600,000 German civilians; approximately 330,000 Japanese civilians (including Hiroshima and Nagasaki)
- The Soviet civilian experience: 25 million homeless; 1,700 towns destroyed; approximately 13–14 million Soviet civilian dead from Nazi occupation policies
- The Nanjing Massacre (1937): 100,000–300,000 Chinese civilians killed by Japanese forces in six weeks

Conclusion:

The claim accurately describes WWII but significantly overstates the case for WWI. In WWI, soldiers constituted the primary category of victims in quantitative terms; civilian suffering, though real and severe, was generally secondary to combatant casualties. In WWII, the deliberate targeting of civilian populations through the Holocaust, strategic bombing, and Japanese and German occupation policies produced civilian death tolls that dramatically exceeded military casualties. The shift from WWI to WWII therefore represents a fundamental change in the nature of 20th-century warfare — from a war that prioritised destroying enemy armies to a war in which entire civilian populations were defined as targets. The claim is therefore a valid generalisation for WWII specifically, but should not be applied uncritically to all 20th-century wars.

Q30.

Question 7: “The Cuban Missile Crisis was the result of Soviet aggression.” To what extent do you agree?

Command term: To what extent — partially agree/disagree; present evidence for and against; reach a qualified conclusion

Thesis (intro): While the Soviet decision to place nuclear missiles in Cuba constituted a bold and destabilising act, characterising it as “aggression” oversimplifies a crisis that arose from mutual provocation, strategic miscalculation, and the competitive logic of the Cold War arms race. The crisis was the product of a sequence of actions by both superpowers — beginning with the Bay of Pigs and the strategic missile imbalance — that made Khrushchev’s gamble, however reckless, comprehensible within the context of Cold War competition.

Case studies: Cuban Missile Crisis (October 1962), contexualised with Bay of Pigs (1961) and strategic missile balance

Paragraph 1 — Evidence supporting “Soviet aggression”:

- Khrushchev authorised the secret placement of medium and intermediate-range ballistic missiles in Cuba capable of reaching major US cities — a dramatic change in the strategic balance
- The missiles were installed without informing the USA and in violation of the Monroe Doctrine (the US position that the Western Hemisphere was its sphere of influence)
- Khrushchev had previously given Kennedy assurances that no offensive weapons would be placed in Cuba — these were lies
- The missiles would have given the USSR the ability to destroy much of the US eastern seaboard with minimal warning time — a genuine threat to US security
- Point: the secrecy, deception, and strategic impact of the missile placement justify describing it as provocative and destabilising

Paragraph 2 — Limitations: prior US provocations:

- The Bay of Pigs invasion (April 1961) — a CIA-backed attempt to overthrow Castro — preceded the missile crisis by 18 months. This US aggression against a sovereign state provided Khrushchev with a legitimate justification for defensive measures
- The USA had nuclear missiles in Turkey (Jupiter missiles) pointed at the USSR — the missile placement in Cuba was partly a response to this strategic imbalance
- Kennedy’s administration was actively planning to assassinate Castro (“Operation Mongoose”) and stage another invasion attempt — Soviet

intelligence was aware of these plans
- Point: Soviet actions were partly defensive responses to US provocations, complicating any straightforward "Soviet aggression" narrative

Paragraph 3 — Structural/systemic factors:

- The Cold War's logic of competitive deterrence created incentives for both sides to seek strategic advantage — the USSR was far behind the USA in ICBMs in 1962 (roughly 300 US ICBMs vs. 20–44 Soviet ICBMs). The Cuban missiles were partly an attempt to address this imbalance cheaply
- Khrushchev also wanted to use the missiles as a bargaining chip to resolve the Berlin crisis — he had been demanding the Western powers leave West Berlin since 1958
- Both superpowers routinely placed military assets near each other's territory — the USA had bases surrounding the USSR in Turkey, Greece, and West Germany
- Point: the systemic logic of the arms race created pressures that made Khrushchev's decision comprehensible, if reckless, within Cold War norms

Paragraph 4 — Resolution and what it reveals:

- The resolution demonstrated that Kennedy was also willing to make concessions — the secret Jupiter missile removal from Turkey. This was not the behaviour of a power that viewed itself as the innocent victim of unilateral Soviet aggression
- Post-Cold War Soviet archives reveal that Khrushchev genuinely feared a US invasion of Cuba and believed the missiles would deter it — security rather than pure aggression was a real motive
- Historian James Blight's "The Shattered Crystal Ball" (based on conference discussions with surviving participants) reveals that both sides misunderstood each other's intentions throughout the crisis

Conclusion:

The characterisation of the Cuban Missile Crisis as "Soviet aggression" captures something real — Khrushchev's decision was reckless, deceptive, and destabilising — but it is incomplete. The crisis arose from a complex matrix of prior US provocations (Bay of Pigs, Jupiter missiles), strategic imbalance, and the competitive logic of Cold War deterrence. A more accurate characterisation is that the crisis was the product of mutual provocation and miscalculation, in which both superpowers contributed to an escalation that nearly ended in nuclear war. Kennedy's secret concessions confirm that both sides bore responsibility for creating the crisis and both sides made concessions to resolve it.

Examiner's note: This answer would score Band 4–5. It addresses the command term directly, supports the claim with specific evidence, presents counterarguments in separate analytical paragraphs, and reaches a nuanced conclusion. The reference to Soviet archives and specific historians demonstrates historiographical awareness.

Q31.

Question 16: Evaluate the success of détente in reducing superpower tensions in the period 1969–1979.

Command term: Evaluate — weigh evidence; assess relative success/failure; reach a judgment

Thesis (intro): Détente achieved significant but limited success in reducing superpower tensions between 1969 and 1979. It produced genuine arms control agreements (SALT I, 1972; Helsinki, 1975) that stabilised the nuclear balance and reduced the risk of accidental war, and it demonstrated that ideological rivals could manage their competition through diplomacy. However, détente failed to stop superpower competition in the developing world and collapsed entirely under the weight of Soviet interventionism in Africa and Afghanistan. Détente managed tensions rather than resolving them.

Case studies: SALT I (1972), Helsinki Accords (1975), Soviet interventions in Africa, Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (1979)

Paragraph 1 — Evidence of success: arms control:

- SALT I (May 1972) froze Soviet and US ICBMs and SLBMs at existing levels — the first bilateral nuclear arms control agreement, recognising approximate strategic parity and creating a framework for future negotiations. The ABM Treaty additionally constrained destabilising missile defences
- The Partial Test Ban Treaty, Hotline Agreement, and the establishment of the Hotline had already reduced crisis communication risks after Cuba (1962)
- Helsinki Accords (1975): the security basket recognised existing borders, reducing European territorial disputes; economic cooperation expanded US-Soviet trade
- Nixon-Brezhnev summits (1972, 1973, 1974) created personal diplomatic channels; summitry itself reduced miscommunication risk
- Point: arms control framework demonstrably reduced the risk of nuclear miscalculation and acknowledged the USSR as a co-equal power deserving negotiation

Paragraph 2 — Evidence of failure: continuing competition:

- Despite SALT I, both superpowers continued developing new weapons not covered by the treaty — multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs) allowed each missile to carry many warheads; total warhead numbers actually increased during détente
- Soviet intervention in Angola (1975–76) — 50,000 Cuban troops, Soviet arms and advisers — propped up the MPLA government. The USA saw this as a violation of détente's spirit

- Soviet involvement in Ethiopia (1977–78) similarly showed that détente had not stopped Soviet expansion in the developing world
- The USA overthrew Allende's government in Chile (1973, Pinochet coup) — covert US interventionism continued equally during détente
- Point: both superpowers continued aggressive competition throughout détente — it was a management tool, not a fundamental change in the nature of the rivalry

Paragraph 3 — Structural limits of détente:

- Détente was built on a personal relationship between Nixon-Kissinger and Brezhnev that was not institutionalised. When Nixon fell (Watergate, 1974) and Kissinger's influence waned under Ford, détente lost its main American architects
- SALT II was never ratified — the US Senate was always sceptical that it was in America's interest; domestic political opposition to détente in the USA was substantial
- The Helsinki human rights provisions, while seen as a concession at the time, actually empowered dissident movements in Eastern Europe that would ultimately undermine the Soviet bloc — an unintended consequence that undermined long-term Soviet acceptance of Helsinki's legitimacy

Paragraph 4 — The collapse of détente:

- The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (December 1979) definitively ended détente. Carter imposed grain embargoes, boycotted the Moscow Olympics, and withdrew SALT II from consideration — describing the invasion as the most serious threat to world peace since World War II
- This rapid collapse suggests détente had never addressed fundamental incompatibilities between US and Soviet interests; it had only managed them temporarily
- Historian Raymond Garthoff argues détente failed because neither side understood it the same way — the USA saw it as mutual restraint; the USSR saw it as management of competition while continuing to advance socialism worldwide

Conclusion:

Détente was a genuine, if limited, success in managing specific risks — particularly nuclear war through arms control — but failed to reduce the underlying competition that drove the Cold War. Its achievements (SALT I, summitry, Helsinki) were real and significant; its limitations (continuing proxy competition, domestic fragility, collapse after Afghanistan) were equally real. The most accurate evaluation is that détente succeeded in making the Cold War safer, temporarily, while failing to make it less competitive. It was a management strategy, not a peace settlement — and it was ultimately too fragile to survive the strains of Soviet expansion.

Examiner's note: This answer scores Band 4–5. It evaluates both successes and failures with specific evidence, maintains analytical focus on the command term throughout, and reaches a nuanced judgment. The reference to Garthoff demonstrates historiographical awareness.